Deep State in Egypt: From Revolution to Dictatorship

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 Abstract

Objective: In the ensuing Egypt revolution on 25 January 2011, no one guesses the military dictatorship could turn back to power within the next two years. Political structure in Egypt since the 1952 Revolution that was won by the heading Free Officers Movement has tilted toward an oligarchic system. It is an intricate web of power that includes an integral part of the state such as the executive, parliament, the judiciary, the military and the rest. It is significant to be mentioned that the role of the military in manipulating political equations is so much striking than the others. In other words, the system of checks and balances has only been written as a part of the Constitution.

Methods: Since the theoretical framework of the current essay is Historical Sociology (HS), its methodology relies on a crossover style. On the one hand, it follows the deduction manner; on the other hand, it pursues the induction one.

Results: The power always has been in the hands of military men in spite of holding elections in Egypt within roughly the last seventy years. This situation that is not strange somehow in the Arab world is called the "deep state".

Conclusion: Although people in Egypt vote for electing their own representatives in parliament, power are concentrated in a particular group. Ostensibly, there is a power rotation but its result is not tangible. The portrayal of the deep state in this country than other states in the region has been remarkable following Arab uprisings. Muslim Brotherhood coming to power despite military antagonism, resisting the Supreme Constitutional Court to elected president and finally ousting Morsi's Administration by a military coup d'état on 3 July 2013 are only parts of the deep state role in the country during last years.

Keywords: Egypt, Deep State, Revolution, Military, Society

1. Introduction

On 11 February 2011, Vice-President Omar Suleiman informed thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square that President Muhammed Hosni Mubarak was relinquishing office and handing power to the military. Hundreds and thousands of demonstrators, who had spent the last 18 days of Egypt's heady uprising waiting for this moment, roared with approval. They raised flags and their chant, "down with the regime", became "we have brought down the regime" (Arnaudo et al, 2013: 14). Back then many believed Mubarak's resignation meant that Egypt was free; Egyptians would be able to choose their own leaders and the country was finally on the path to democracy. Mubarak was put on trial for conspiring to kill protesters. During his court the former president and his sons gazed out from behind the bars of a cage, a humiliation many would never have dared to think possible throughout his 30-year rule over the country, during which he imprisoned opponents without trial, allowed corruption to flourish and rejected to lift martial law. But victory was short lived. Over the years that followed, as Egypt's first democratically elected president was ousted in a coup and military strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi rose to power. As the military muscled themselves back into Egyptian politics, many predicted the return of the "deep state" (Hamid, 2017:2-3); the pillars of the previous regime, which collectively maintained privilege for a select few. The intelligence (*mukhabaraat*), the police, the judiciary and the media are all part of this deep state, but none has more influence than the military.

The Egyptian army has often been described as a state within a state. They own many of their own enterprises such as hospitals, clubs, restaurants, factories and hotels that profits of them are fed back into the army. Estimates have placed the share of the economy controlled by the military as high as 40 percent and this rate has been flourished under Sisi's Egypt (Transparency International, 2018; Reuters, 2018). It is in their interest, therefore, to protect all of this. It was the 2011 revolution that drew back the curtain on just how tight a grip the army had on Egyptian society; but the military had been dictating events for many years. Since 1952, when the Free Officers overthrew the British backed monarchy, only those who have passed through the military system have gone on to rule Egypt. With this in mind, the fact that Mubarak was preparing his son, Gamal, to step into his shoes. When the time came it would have disgruntled the army, because Gamal was no military man. Moreover, the former president was accused of opening up the economy to private businesses which was undermining the military's monopoly.

Along with increasing pressure from the protesters, these factors made it easy for the army to sacrifice Mubarak in 2011; but rather than disappearing, as his resignation suggested, the army simply waited in the wings to reinstate their control over Egypt. When they turn back to power they couldn't release the former president, since a myriad of people would object, but the punishment wouldn't be too harsh. Sure enough, in November 2014 the Cairo Criminal Court found the case against Mubarak to be groundless, citing procedural irregularities. At the same time, his former interior minister, Habib al-Adly, and

six former interior ministry officials were acquitted. The only successful charge to stand against Mubarak is that of corruption. But even that was only afforded a three year prison sentence and in 2015 a judge declared this to be complete (Hawthorne and Miller, 2019).

Authorities have also failed to hold many of Mubarak's cronies accountable for their actions. Business tycoon Hussein Salem has been poised to return to Egypt for months. Salem Having fled the country in 2011, was charged in his absence to 15 years in prison and fined $4 billion for money laundering and profiteering. Salem has now reached a reconciliation agreement with the Egyptian government for the sum of $596.5 million so that the corruption charges are waived and his family can return to Egypt without fear of prosecution (Egypt Today, 2017). During years after he resigned, the failure to hold Mubarak to account for killing protesters within Egypt's 18-day uprising is symbolic of the culture of impunity enjoyed by officials in Egypt. This culture of impunity is made all the more poignant when it is contrasted with the crackdown currently being administered against the opposition in the country. In August 2013 a judge sentenced 37 people to death and 491 to life imprisonment for killing a single police officer. Yet not one member of the security forces, or a public official, has faced charges for the massacre of up to 1,000 protesters in Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square that took place in the same month. In the early days of the revolution, people across the world believed that Mubarak's resignation meant freedom and an end to the impunity he fostered throughout his thirty years in power. In fact, it was a bare face of deep state in Egypt.

The above explanations make clear, the state as a political entity that usually is entwined with nation, has relied on army rather than society in Egypt. In other words, the relations between state and society in Egypt imply mechanical connections than organic ones. This situation guides the system (*Nizam*) toward shaping a notorious state in which people do not have right to ask officials' responsibilities. In the following pars of article, I focus first on state theory in Historical Sociology (HS) as a theoretical framework; second, the history of emerging deep state in the political science literature would be studied; and finally, it being concentrated on the disturbance of varied parts of government in obstructing the first freely elected state afterward the 2011 revolution.

2. Theoretical framework: State in Historical Sociology

One of the prominent authors in the second generation of Historical sociology (HS), Michael Mann who is well-known for his neo-Weberian inclinations, believe that state generally has two powers in sorting affairs out in a country. First, it is "despotic power" which refers to the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups (Mann 1988: 5). This shape of power connotes a zero-sum contest between state and society. Therefore the state does not steam from society; it exerts program through agencies or by relying on aristocratic class (territorial federalism). Second, he argues that there is another form of state

power that has been ignored by standard statism, what he calls "infrastructural power". This refers to the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm (Mann, 1993: 55). Infrastructural capacity is power-neutral in that it does not imply a contest between state and social actors in which one wins out at the other's expense. The symbol on an infrastructural power is modern states that have high infrastructural influence, albeit their despotic power is low.

In this context, Mann points up two patterns of state: "true elitism" and "institutional statism". In first model that has some commonality with neorealist/elitist theory of the state, the state elites seek an unproblematic and singular conception of the national interest (i.e. military survival). It views the state as autonomous to the extent that it confronts and conflicts with social actors within civil society, which is generally equivalent to what Mann calls despotic power. The essence of second model, institutional statism, is that the state cannot be conceived of as a rational coherent entity that acts according to a single rationality (e.g. capitalist, or militarist, or democratic or patriarchal).

According to Mann, state is a polymorphous phenomenon that is composed of several identities. The new model of governing especially afterward the Cold War is defined in terms of institutional statism. So that domestic agential state power or autonomy is not something which is used against society (as is conventionally assumed), but implies cooperation with social actors. Connection between state and society alludes to the Infrastructural power; generally, it is a reciprocal communication that allows the state to control society and varied parties and interest groups can influence a state (Hobson, 2000: 199). This contrasts with Giddens' notion of the surveillance powers of the state, which implies a degree of despotic power in which a strong state is able to manipulate society; a power that is present in democratic societies but is maximised under totalitarian regimes (Giddens, 1985). In sociological image of state, origins of interior independence is determined by connecting with social forces rather than confronting to society. In other words, the state not only is embedded in inner social-class relations but its functional capacity in connecting with society will be complete. Given the shortage of mutual relations between society and political system in Egypt it seems current theoretical framework able to analyze varied facets of the deep state in driving out democratically elected state after the 2011 revolution. Methodologically, HS is relied simultaneously on qualitative and quantitative approaches. It means current framework not only considers economic data role in rising revolts within the Arab society including Egypt also based on the path dependency, it focuses on state's historical stems.

3. Deep State in Political Science Literature

 Although the usage of deep state in Political Science texts has been prevailed after coming Donald Trump to power in the U.S. and ensuing last presidential election (2016), the advent of this expression originated in Turkey, where secretive conspiracies hatched in the corridors of power and removed from the democratic process shadow the nation's politics. Deep state in Turkey (*derin devlet*), is defined as a network of individuals in different branches of government, with links to retired generals and organized crime, that existed without the knowledge of high ranking military officers and politicians. The genesis of the Turkish deep state is traceable to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a secret society founded in Istanbul in 1889 by a group of medical students who had a passion for reform in the Ottoman Empire (Kaya, 2009: 101).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the country's founder, was counted among the seminal members of the CUP, the political party that ruled the empire during its final decade. While the CUP upheld the façade of being an open party committed to parliamentary government and the rule of law, its members maintained a secret parallel system of control over the country. As the empire entered the final throes of its collapse, the CUP relied upon its clandestine arms to maintain power and eliminate perceived threats to the state. Among the chief acts associated with this concealed power structure was the Armenian genocide, which was in part executed with the aid of paramilitaries and civilian loyalists linked to the CUP. While Atatürk may have stayed aloof of the government's anti-Armenian policies, secretive CUP operatives proved instrumental in supporting his rise in the lead-up to the republic's establishment in 1923.

For some scholars, the CUP era led to the development of a culture of conspiracy and subversion within the ranks of the Turkish state. The repeated military coups that wracked Turkey during the 20th century are often depicted as a legacy of the CUP's dependency upon cabals within the Ottoman army to maintain its grip over the empire. Of all the events that have come to epitomize the role of secret factions within Turkish history, the so-called "Susurluk Incident" of 1996 stands as the clearest and most visceral case pointing to the enduring power of clandestine actors. The case, which exposed the government's recruitment of gangsters as hitmen to prosecute its dirty war against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), appeared to point to a broader pattern of malfeasance and violence among members of Turkey's political establishment (Gingeras, 2019). Susurluk seemed to suggest that the elected government was merely a shell that masked the identity of the country's true rulers, a list which included elements of the military, the intelligence service, the mafia, and the business elite. The goal of this alliance, it was generally assumed, was simple: kill or discredit anyone who they believed threatened the integrity of the Turkish state and nation. The secretive, extralegal nature of this presumed establishment was essential to what most citizens came to believe was Turkey's deep state.

According to this elucidating history, the deep state is defined as a type of formal and informal of domination which results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings. The concept of deep state is formed on the positive and negative poles that should be made explicit. In the continuum of three classical subtypes of state (formal, semi-formal, and informal state), the positive pole of deep state constitutes the semi-formal state, while the negative pole is the informal state. The state oscillates between these three forms. The form of the state changes according to the extent of undemocratic informal institutions' fusion with formal institutions, whether civilian rulers tilt the balance in the informal domination's favor, or whether the deep state exerts ideological hegemony (Söyler, 2015: 43).

In the formal state, informal institutions are basically in accord with formal democratic institutions. In the semi-formal state, dual domination signals deep state's existence; civilian rulers appease this modality of dual domination. However, when the deep state shifts to the informal state, political power holders actively cooperate with criminal, semi-formal institutions and enforce a sui generis repertoire. This close fit between informal rules and behavior emerges without fail, if militarism and raison d'état, alone or instilled by an official ideology, manages to unite segments of society under its hegemony. In a permanent state of exception, formal institutions turn into a façade. In the informal state, deep state is converted into the state, the rule, and the norm. As such, the informal state inhabits precisely the line of demarcation between autocracy and democracy where the difference between authoritarian regime and defective democracy is nominal.

Above explanation implies shared circumstances in the Middle East so that Springborg ascribe it to Orientalism (Springborg, 2018: 136). On the one hand, the informal and formal state in the region has knitted together since emerging the modern state in the Middle East ensuing WWI. On the other hand, there is a great cleavage between three kinds of states (formal, semi-formal and informal) and society in the most part of the region. The Middle Eastern origins of the term and its particular applicability to the politics of that region were then further emphasized with reference to Egypt, where the one-year rule of President Mohammad Morsi and his party Muslim Brotherhood was undermined by that country's deep state, the bureaucracy, the military and the security services, all intent on the perpetuation of the military-dominated political system (Tharoor, 2017).

The foundation of deep state in Egypt traced back to 1952 revolution when a group of young officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser conducted a coup to overthrow the monarchy, the military has been the dominant institution in the country. Until the election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012, each of Egypt's presidents was drawn from the officer corps. These included Muhammad Naguib (a respected general but a figurehead, who was sidelined in 1954), Nasser (who died in 1970), Anwar Sadat (assassinated in 1981), and Mubarak. The military's role in politics was typically hidden from view, and unlike other powerful militaries, for instance in Pakistan, Algeria or

Turkey, Egyptian generals were tight-lipped about their part in key state decisions. As scholars who work on Egypt will readily attest, the generals were simply unavailable to foreign and Egyptian researchers alike. Yet, among highly placed state officials, such as the late Osama al-Baz, who was for many years Mubarak's national security adviser, the veto power of the generals was a fact of life, as he discreetly hinted during an interview in Cairo in 1999. One example was the inability of Mubarak to engineer the succession of his son Gamal, who was carefully groomed for the presidency but was mistrusted and opposed by the top military brass. As for this situation, the "deep state" has been used to describe the deep-rooted vested interest of Mubarak-era officials that dominate the circles of the armed forces, the judicial system, and intelligence services (Clevers and Nimeh, 2015: 17-8). As such, in this system the comprehensive institutional reform is difficult to accomplish.

4. Egypt Deep State after the 2011 Revolution

As it repetitively mentioned in previous sections, Egypt faced a number of challenges in the years before mass protests facilitated the removal of long-term president, Hosni Mubarak, on 11 February 2011. Primarily, protester demands took the form of rights-based grievances, political resentment and economic complaint. This was not the first time civic action had highlighted these issues. Indeed, the growing influence and strategies developed over the previous decade by Egypt's labour movements, pro-democracy activists, Islamist activists and internet campaigns against police brutality were instrumental in the mobilization of protesters. The chosen date of protest in 2011, 25 January – the national police holiday – was indicative of the numerous rights-based grievances in Egypt. In particular, the focus was on opposition to police brutality and an atmosphere of impunity among state security facilitated by the 31-year state of emergency that allowed for military trials of civilians without the possibility of appeal. Another facet of rights-based grievances focused on the political and social discrimination of Egypt's minority groups. Such groups included the ethnic and religious minorities of the Nubians[1], Bedouins[2] and Coptic Orthodox Christians[3]. However, other significant segments of society that are powerful catalysts for social and economic development and change faced social, economic and political exclusion including the youth, 61% of the

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1- Nubians are an ethno linguistic group of Africans indigenous to present-day Sudan and southern Egypt who originate from the early inhabitants of the central Nile valley, believed to be one of the earliest cradles of civilization. They speak Nubian languages, part of the Northern Eastern Sudanic languages.
2- The Bedouin or Bedu are a grouping of nomadic Arab people who have historically inhabited the desert regions in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and the Levant.
3- Coptic Orthodox Christians are an ethnoreligious group indigenous to Northeast Africa who primarily inhabits the area of modern Egypt, where they are the largest Christian denomination in the country. Copts are also the largest Christian denomination in Sudan and Libya. Historically, they spoke the Coptic language, a direct descendant of the Demotic Egyptian that was spoken in late antiquity.

population was under the age of 30 and 34.2 percent was under 15 years old in 2011 (Karasapan and Shah, 2018).

The largest excluded group consisted of Egypt's lower classes. Although development indicators in Egypt showed improvement since 1990, the population boom, increased migration from rural to urban regions, and growing unemployment placed public facilities under great stress. Internationally recommended neo-liberal reforms rewarded the political and business state-oriented elite first. Moreover, the ruling National Democratic Party maintained a strict monopoly on political power, as highlighted by the constitutional amendments of 2005 and 2007 as well as through practices such as ballot stuffing and violence against civilians. These circumstances provided a fertile environment for the banned Muslim Brotherhood organization, which took responsibility for several aspects of local governance including the establishment of health, educational, civil and religious organizations, regardless of civil society restrictions set by the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Lastly, displeasure among elites festered as the prospect of patrimonial rule and a transfer of power to Mubarak's son, Gamal, appeared more likely (Pierce, 2013: 74). In the next section, some point contests between the deep state's elements and president Morsi who came from Muslim Brotherhood are studied.

4-1. Cosmetic reforms

 The ensuing 2011 revolution, institutional and constitutional reforms attempted to address political grievances that arose from an inefficient state. Afterwards the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) came in power for the first 16 months following Mubarak, it mandated parliamentary elections from November 2011 to January 2012, and further successful elections took place in 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2018. In the first free and fair elections in Egypt's history, two-thirds of parliament seats went to an Islamist bloc consisting of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafist al-Nour Party. Meanwhile, the 2012 presidential elections on 3 July witnessed the victory of the FJP candidate Mohammed Morsi over Mubarak's last Prime Minister and the former General, Ahmed Shafiq. Both candidacies were spoiled with contention: Morsi as an Islamist candidate from a group opposed to former regime and its supporters had repressed occasionally since the 1950s, and Shafiq as a representative of the former regime.

The Islamist victory in the polls was indicative of how the balance of power had shifted among the Egyptian elite. More importantly, it represented an opening of the Egyptian political system to include formerly banished groups. Nonetheless, under the surface, the individuals and practices of the Mubarak era remained influential. The term, the "deep state" has been used to describe the deep-rooted vested interest of Mubarak-era officials that dominate the inner-circles of the armed forces, the intelligence services and the Interior Ministry. As such, comprehensive institutional reform was difficult to accomplish. Within six months, the Supreme Court, consisting of Mubarak-era judges, dissolved the Parliament (Völkel, 2017: 595-6). However, in a controversial step, within early

weeks of his electoral victory, Morsi reinstated Parliament until new elections were announced. Furthermore, Morsi was quick to revoke the SCAF's constitutional declaration issued a few days before he became President, which aimed at limiting his executive power. In August, Morsi also reshuffled a number of high-level positions in the military and dismissed Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi the SCAF leader, in what appeared to be an attempt to regain the loyalty of the military.

The hard struggle between remnants of previous regime (*faloul in Arabic*) and elected officials was extended to the constitutional drawing up process which became a mainstay of political controversy from 2011 to 2014. This period saw the creation of three Constitutional Assemblies (CAs), two referendums on two constitutions held on 26 December 2012 and 18 January 2014, as well as four constitutional declarations issued: three by SCAF and one by Morsi (Roll, 2015). Nonetheless, continued political turmoil surrounding institutional and constitutional reform failed to improve the Egyptian economy. A major factor in the provocation of the 2011 revolution, economic stagnation was mobilized alongside accusations of exclusionary practices by the Islamist bloc, to become the primary justification used by the Rebel (*Tamarod*) campaign, which led to the mass protests of June and July 2013 and the intervention by the armed forces on 3 July.

4-2. Civil rights

One of the controversial points in conflicting between new elected state and remainders of former regime was civil rights. The ratification of the 2012 Constitution took place by Morsi's administration despite its vagueness on human rights, minority rights and freedom of expression as well as allowing civilian trials by military courts. Some of these issues were resolved in the 2014 Constitution. The 2014 Egyptian Constitution addresses the rights of persons with disabilities in nine separate references. Most significant is the explicit prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability, and recognition of health, economic, social, cultural, entertainment, sporting, and education rights. It also granted Nubians repatriation to the former territories they were displaced from by the building of the Aswan Dam. The 2014 Constitution also underscored cultural rights, in another part (Lord and Stein, 2018: 231-3).

Meanwhile, vague terminology hampered efforts to ensure rights for other vulnerable groups. Appropriate representation was granted to workers, farmers, women, youth, Christians and expatriate Egyptians in new Constitution (2014), but there was no further clarification of what was deemed to be "appropriate". Pieces restricting women's rights in the 2012 Constitution were removed and the new one (2014) stipulated that women were equal to men in all civic, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Freedom of belief was apparently guaranteed, but in both of them (2012, 2014) state protection was only granted for the Abrahamic religions. However, constitutional restrictions on freedom of expression via previous Constitution (2012) were removed from the new one, although it remained part of the criminal laws.

As for military courts, the 2012 Constitution had ambiguous phrasing that could have referred civilians to the military judiciary, but was later redrafted. Nevertheless, it remained unclear in the 2014 Constitution, so that Article 204 limited civilian trials by the military judiciary. Moreover, the military remained impervious to civilian oversight (Human Right Watch, 2016).

4-3. The power struggle

The first protests on 25 January 2011 were primarily mobilized by educated and unemployed youths and political activists, who were accompanied by broader societal groups as protests continued unabated. However, as soon as Mubarak stepped down, more established political entities sidelined the youth and lower classes. Some youth groups such as "April 6 Youth Movement" (*Harakat al-Shabaab 6 Abril*) and "Youth Union of Maspero" continued to hold some political sway through street mobilization. However, Morsi's government put in place new laws in order to curtail the continuous stream of protests. These laws, alongside strict regulations on civil society organizations, constrained the ability of youth groups to organize.

Aside from organizations within the state apparatus, the Muslim Brotherhood was undoubtedly best suited to take advantage of the political opening. Using its charitable and religious networks set up over decades, the Brotherhood leveraged the electoral power needed to ensure dominance in both the parliamentary and the presidential elections of 2012 (Forster, 2017: 4). The first constitutional initiative was a product of the initial inclusivity of the Egyptian system, which allowed formerly banned groups access to state institutions via democratic means. The apprehension about the Brotherhood held by the deep state was not shared by Egypt's lower and middle classes for whom religion is a major facet of personal and collective identity. Thus, for many of Egypt's Sunni Muslims, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and Morsi represented a devout change from the corrupt regime of Mubarak that represented by Shafiq's candidacy. However, once in power, the Islamist bloc was reluctant to share the democratic setting with their political rivals. As a result, justified by the electoral legitimacy, inclusion was not a priority as much as wrestling power with the holdovers.

This was particularly apparent in the constitutional drafting process of 2012. In the first Constituent Assembly (CA) Islamist bloc together won about 70 percent of seats (Kirkpatrick, 2012). Deemed unrepresentative, the Assembly was dissolved less than a month later by the Cairo Administrative Court because it breached the SCAF's declaration of March 2011. The second CA of 2012 was more diverse due to an unlimited cap on civil society representatives and the appointment of its members by the Parliament rather than the reliance on electoral percentages. However, the Islamist bloc by 55% maintained a numerical majority. On 14 June 2012, when the Supreme Court dissolved the Parliament, the legality of the second CA was challenged since the Parliament chose the CA, but the Assembly remained following Morsi's decree on 8 July. As the drafting process continued, tensions increased dramatically: street battles

broke out between Morsi's proponents and opponents, on one hand, and the police, on the other hand. At the end of the drafting process, as secular and leftist members of the CA walked out in protest of Islamist dominance, Morsi issued a constitutional declaration on 22 November blocking any dissolution of the Assembly by the judiciary. Lawsuits and the protest resignations of Morsi's advisors, Samir Marcos (a Christian fellow) and Sekina Fouad (a woman), did not deter the declaration's durability. Nevertheless, the November 2012 declaration became a key point of reference for the subsequent evilization of the FJP state, with narratives surfacing that underscored how Morsi worked for the Muslim Brotherhood rather than the Egyptian people as a whole (El-Sherif, 2014: 9).

After Morsi's deposal on 3 July 2013, the immediate goal was political stability. The second constitutional initiative was thus instigated as a means to show the inclusiveness of the incoming regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as well as symbolically wash the country's hands of Morsi's legacy. Morsi advocates alongside with other liberal and leftist anti-coup institutions that opposed the military's interference in the democratic process were forcibly scattered and took away of the ability to voice their discontent and subject to immense repression by the coup regime. By the end of 2013, the Brotherhood was tagged a terrorist entity first by the media and then the judiciary, and forced underground. Pro-Morsi supporters that remained politically active condemned the new 2013 constitutional process and boycotted it. Indeed, in the third CA, only one member was alleged to have ties with the Brotherhood. The structure of the third CA was reformed to include the so-called Committee of 10: the legal experts with drafting a list of constitutional amendments and it served in a consultative role to the Committee of 50. The latter consisted of appointed members from public and private organizations, institutions and syndicates, including political parties, the police, the military, the church, and al-Azhar. Thus, on paper, the 2013 CA appeared more representative (Meyer-Resende, 2014: 6-8), but the absence of Egypt's significant Islamist current damaged its inclusivity.

4-4. Manipulating religious sensitivity

Critical moments during Egypt's post-2011 era were most evident in the widely broadcast incidents when segments of society would victimize the "other" in the name of either religion or nationalism for political gain. This scapegoating trend occurred on several occasions during the rise and political dominance of the Islamist bloc and then continued against the Muslim Brotherhood in the succeeding backlash ensuing Morsi's sack. Sectarian events, for instance, the Maspero Massacre of October 2012 or the April 2013 attack on St. Mark's Cathedral, the Seat of the Coptic Pope in Cairo, occurred more often after the 2011 revolution. Such events were also indicative of the dramatic decline in rule of law in Egypt, as well as a lack of professionalism among segments of Egypt's media outlets and state security, the latter of which participated in the above-mentioned incidents (Brownlee, 2013).

In part, such incidents were spurred by the lack of a consensus candidate who could represent Egyptian unity, the role that al-Sisi attempted to fulfill in his role as a national rescuer. Increasing sectarianism was also a by-product of the politicization of Egypt's main religious institutions, the Coptic Orthodox Church and the al-Azhar as a thousand-year bastion of Islamic jurisprudence, by the regime in order to demarcate dissidents. However, despite claims rebutting function in politics, both Pope Tawadros and the Azhar Grand Imam Ahmed al-Tayeb became political figures after the 2011 revolution, which in turn made them polarizing characters. Because of the Copts' reliance on the protection of the state in an increasingly Islamicized environment, Pope Tawadros avoided direct criticism of state forces and the military despite their involvement in the attacks on Copts at Maspero and St. Marks.

Due to Tawadros' lack of criticism, hardline Islamists condemned the Copts belonging to the old regime as a part of the deep state and used sectarian rhetoric to justify political violence against them. Meanwhile, the al-Azhar leadership held ideological differences to the Brotherhood concerning Salafism which had become a dominant trend in the Brotherhood. Furthermore, the segregation between the al-Azhar leadership and the integral part of Brotherhood-supporting students grew wider following the rhetoric of some senior al-Azhar officials justifying the crackdown on pro-Morsi protesters (Bano, 2018: 2). Thus, the regime after coup combined religion with state propaganda, thereby discrediting the religious institutions among their constituents and their opponents and diminishing the ability of religious leaders to intervene positively despite their best attempts.

4-5. Bringing down the elected state

At first, the opening of the Egyptian political system through electoral politics granted formerly excluded group's access. However, optimism eroded as identity politics emerged as a key mobilizing factor and economic stability failed to realize. Dissatisfied political, business and military elites, who rose to their prominent positions during the Mubarak era, with Islamist dominance in the legislature, the Presidential Office, and the 2012 CAs mobilized their resources within and beyond the state to form a counter-narrative aiming to discredit the Islamist bloc. Exclusive practices by the Islamist bloc, including the forced ratification of the 2012 constitution, the deteriorating state of the Egyptian economy, and narratives highlighting the fanaticism of Morsi's supporters, became part of the justification used by the activist group Tamarod which supported by parts of deep state, especially the intelligence and armed forces, for its campaign against Morsi in the spring of 2013. The mass protests from 29 June to 3 July 2013 arose because Tamarod's unrest provided the armed forces with the necessary momentum to step in and remove President Morsi (Springborg, 2017: 486-7).

In its aftermath, the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre was only the public façade of a comprehensive crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, with almost 60,000 arrested between July 2013 and 2016 and others either in exile or disappeared.

The gradual political reforms from 2005 onwards that paved the way for attending members of the Brotherhood in Parliament, though banned at the time, were stripped away entirely. Moreover, liberal, secular and leftist groups have since been subject to mass repression, with the state broadening its targets to include anyone openly vocal of their disapproval of the state or the President. Nonetheless, some cosmetic changes did occur. In the 2015 Parliament, women made-up 14.9% of parliamentary seats, up from 1.8% in 2012 and 12% in 2010. Representatives under the age of 35 won 13.4% of seats, double their quota in the previous round. However, the legitimacy of this accomplishment is questionable considering the steady decline in voter turnout from 54% in the second round of the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, to 10% in the 2015 elections, illustrating popular disillusionment with this process (Forster, 2017: 7).

5. Conclusion

After celebrating the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011by millions of Egyptians everyone thought years of suffering the abuses, corruption, and neglect of an unimaginative and calcified regime devoted first and foremost to its own survival, multitudes of struggling Egyptians looked forward to a brighter future. But the power struggle between the Morsi administration, on the one hand, the police, the military, and the judiciary, on the other hand, showed that the secular forces gradually, and especially after the state poor performance in the parliamentary elections, started sharply to take away themselves from the Islamists and to side defacto with the military and the judiciary. This coalition made a structure is called "deep state" and it impeded the formal democratically elected state progress. It is important to be noticed that the central point in resisting remnants of the old regime was their interesting. In Egypt, where national identity largely converges with that of the state and the integrity of the state is not in question, the uprising has exacerbated social cleavages and ideological divisions that there were before the Nile revolution and threaten to rip apart the societal fabric. It is true that democratic transitions are nonlinear; normally they face many obstructions on the way and suffer from periodic obstacles. The removal of Egypt's first elected government in July 2013 by a military coup d'état, the imprisonment and persecution of the former ruling party's leadership by the military, and the indiscriminate massacre of pro-Brotherhood demonstrators by the army and the police, leading to more than a thousand deaths, are in essence a throwback to the darkest days of the Mubarak dictatorship. But as one commentator has pointed out, "this time, the military agreed with the protesters. But next time, when protesters call for something that isn't in the army's interest, they will meet a very different fate. Today they are called "the people"; tomorrow they will be labeled seditious saboteurs. A year from now, the dreamy youth who celebrated and danced when Mr. Morsi was overthrown may well find themselves in the cell next door to the Brotherhood" (Abou El Fadl, 2013).

It is true that President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood committed major mistakes, including railroading a constitution through the Constituent Assembly in the absence of opposition members. One should note, however, that the constitution was put to a referendum and approved by nearly two-thirds of the voters. Furthermore, many of the Muslim Brotherhood's "excesses" were forced upon it by the uncooperative, indeed downright obstructionist, strategies employed by the secular opposition parties. Another aspect, the animosity of elements of deep state made the Brotherhood all the more dependent on the Salafi parties with their more extremist Islamist agendas, some of which were reflected in the constitution drafted under Morsi's watch. Moreover, the judiciary, especially the Constitutional Court, whose members were Mubarak-era appointees and continued to be loyal to the old regime, did its utmost to prevent the functioning of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of constitutional government. Morsi's inability to control the police, again staffed by holdovers from the Mubarak era who engaged in deliberately fostering chaos, contributed to the sense of executive indecisiveness and added to the insecurity experienced by the Egyptian people during the one year of the Brotherhood's rule.

Above all, Morsi's decision to permit the military to retain its corporate, including budgetary, autonomy shielded it from civilian oversight and public accountability. This combined with the fact that he appointed the military chief, General Sisi, who he mistakenly believed was an ideological comrade, as Defense Minister meant that the President, although nominally the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, completely lost control of the primary coercive apparatus of the state, thus paving the way for the coup d'état that removed him from office in July 2013. The overthrow of Egypt's first elected President and government did not bode well for the future of democracy neither in Egypt nor in the Middle East.

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