

The Ill-Balanced Triangles of the Islamic States in Crisis

Hamid Reza Malek Mohammadi*

Associate Professor, University of Tehran

Abstract

Policy implementation is among the most important Stages in the policy cycle (Lester et al., 2000:5). Policy-makers know well that this stage is so essential that can affect all aspects of politics in local, national and international levels. Despite this fact, policies implemented do not have often the desired results. This article tries to analyze this phenomenon in the Islamic states using an integrator pattern, combining the triangles of Etzioni and Hirshman.

Key word: Etzioni, Hirshman, Policy Implementation, Islamic States

* Received on: 2013/October/9 Accepted on: 2013/December/21

Email: malekgl@yahoo.com

Introduction

There are those who believe that policy-making process is terminated when a policy is produced, but it is not the case in nearly all circumstances. That is why Anderson (1975) notes that a policy is made when it is implemented and is implemented when it is made. That is to say –with Clausewitz words-implementation is policy-making but other means.

The importance of policy implementation made Pressman and Wildavsky to study in their work-Implementation (1973: XV) –the process of policy implementation in the United States during a thirty year period to show the obstacles confront a successful implementation. From this point of view, implementation is seen as a process of interaction between goals, regulations and what is to be done. In other words, implementation is the power to make the necessary links in the casual chain of phenomena until a policy is put into action. When these links are used then to eliminate the difficulties raised from non-obvious goals and inaccessible sources, implementation will be diluted. Thus implementation is-as Gaggling notes (1990:34)- a process, an output and an outcome.

Policy implementation is believed to be one of the most difficult stages of policy-making cycle, but why? - A question once was asked by Gunn in his study “why implementation is so difficult?”(Gunn, 1978), and before him by Hood (1976) in his work named “The limits of administration”. Although he believes in military-like organization for a complete implementation with obvious command lines, clear goals and high levels of inter-organizational communications. But the question still remains.

The problem of not getting an exact answer for the question, have its roots in various and complicate factors the implementation faces with. An astonishing simple question behind which a wonderful land of paradoxical problems exists.

Balanced and ill-balanced triangles: A general view

Etzioni and the triangle of LFM

In his study concerning the complex organizations, Etzioni (1961) mentions three essential factors in obeying the laws, policies and commands: Love, Fear and Money (LFM). With the first factor of this list, the behavior of individuals is made on the basis of love, with no need for force or coercive action. They act because they want it themselves. With the second factor, the fear, we confront the individuals who act because of their fear from consequences of failure policies and in a lower level, a failure to obey laws and regulations. Finally, the third factor-money-is a base for behavior, even if an individual hates to act, the rewards push him to act. By these three factors, Etzioni looks at policy implementation as a product of a normative, coercive or rewarding power.

Although this does not seem impossible for a policy to be implemented by one of these factors but in real world, a combination of factors will have acceptable results. Effectiveness and efficiency in implementation are considered to be the result of achieving a balance in this combination. For having such a balance, we should have a low level of fear and then a

high level of rewards through love. This is what we can see in the “Three faces of power” in Boulding’s study (1990) as a strategy for policy implementation shaped by a combinational view within which convergent, threatening and bargaining actions are the main ingredients.


Policy implementation is the product of the above combination, the next step of which will be testing of it which is called policy evaluation. Here we believe that one of the best ways to examine the successful policies is to show the rate of satisfaction of citizens from the services presented to them. Satisfaction means here the permission of policy continuation. But if the receivers of services-the citizens- draw an undesired image of a policy, what would be the choices they confront with? Here, Hirshman may help us with his triangle of EVL.

Hirshman and the triangle of EVL

To answer this exiting question, Hirshman (1970) tries to present a model in his general sphere of economic analysis. In his view, when a consumer-citizen in a political view-is not satisfied with the goods and services-policies-may then chose to “Exit” -confrontation in politics- that is to use other firms or institutions to fulfill his/her necessities. The second choice of such a consumer may be “voice” -political complaint- which is a kind of alert. It should be mentioned that “voice” may act to complete the former choice-Exit- since this way may reveals as a difficult or expensive one. Voice may affect the situation made the consumer/citizen unsatisfied, but how? Here is the turn for “Loyalty” to act as the third way chosen by a consumer.

Loyalty exists between Exit and Voice and may postpone the Exit choice and increase the desirability of Voice. It happens that a citizen with a possibility to Exit may imagine that his/her exit would be concerned as an anti-loyal attitude and hence, not suitable. Here if the consumers-citizens assume that their exit will damage the system, they would choose either Voice or Loyalty instead of Exit. Since these consumers are rational actors, they may compare cost of Exit with the possible cost of new entrance. The more cost of entrance, the less the desire to exit.

Figure 1: Cost of voice and exit



Point A: high cost=low exit +high loyalty
 Point B: low cost =high exit + low loyalty

As it is seen above, cost does make an unequal behavior for an actor. When it is high in the point A for example, the actor will stay in the left side of the horizontal line but in upper half of the vertical line and vice versa when cost is low in the point B for example.

Integrator pattern

We believe that for achieving the better results in policy implementation, citizens should be transformed into efficient consumers-actors with the best choices in each situation. For this, the LFM and EVL triangles should be put in one set in such a way that each angle of one triangle stands in front of its appropriate angle of the other triangle with the most important angle on the top.

Here we show three angles of Etzioni and Hirshman triangles. In the left column, love, money and fear construct Etzioni’s triangle and the right column shows loyalty, voice and exit. The important point is that each angle in left stands in front of its symmetric angle in right.


Table 1: the symmetric angles

Etzioni triangle	Hirshman triangle
Loyalty	Love
Voice	Money
Exit	Fear

If we assume the Hirshman triangle as the result of policy implementation functioning in the framework of the Etzioni triangle, then a failure to locate an appropriate angle on the top will result in the location of an inappropriate angle on the top its symmetric triangle.

The importance of such pattern, reveals its effects on preventing undesired behaviors rather than the successful policy implementation. A rational internal combination of the Etzioni triangle (i.e. high reward and low fear through love) or any other combination of these factors will be mirrored in its symmetric triangle of Hirshmsn. So this triangle of evaluation and act-the Hirshman triangle- will be a reflection of the triangle of implementation-the Etzioni triangle. Wherever the top angle of Etzioni triangle is turned down,its symmetric triangle will turn down to cope with

Figure 2: Normal and balanced situation




The most important point here is that the internal balance in the Etzioni triangle along with its top angle will have an eminent role both in the balance of the Hirshman triangle and in the total balance of policy implementation.

Islamic states and crisis: A question of balanced or ill-balanced triangles

What was described above as the integrator pattern of the Etzioni-Hirshman triangles seems to be ill-balanced in many Islamic states. I believe that in the most political regions of our planet, stability and security-political as well as economic-are concerned as the most sensitive problems in a macro level of analysis when we imagine the whole region and also in a micro level of an individual country. The focal point of the integrator pattern is the ill-balance phenomena which is the balance of the Etzioni triangle reflected by the Hirshmsn triangle. In a normal situation, the second triangle turns with the turning of the first triangle. For example, if the Etzioni triangle turns in a way that the top angle of "Love" goes down and the angle of "Fear" comes up, the same change will happen in the Hirshman triangle by its turning; "Loyalty" will go down

and “Exit” will come up as shown above. This is what happens in a normal situation and the result of policies concerning the change of the top point is due to what policy-makers have decided. But the illness reveals when a kind of manipulation is done in the turning movement of the second triangle. Here, while the first triangle is turning, the second triangle is locked. For example, when politicians seek loyalty in the Hirshman triangle but it is not possible to produce it by its symmetric angle in the Etzioni triangle- Love. In such a situation, if they use” Fear” as the top angle of the first triangle, the second triangle should normally turn so as the “Exit” reveals at the top. But how when the second triangle is locked? It is here that the ill balance reveals. (Below)

Figure3: Abnormal and ill-balanced situation



In many Islamic states, in critical situations especially at macro level-that is at the level of bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations among each other as well as in their own country at a micro level, the second triangle-the Hirshman triangle-is locked with an ideal angle for politicians on the top and what turns is only the first triangle which turns by changing their policies. Here the intern mechanism of our pattern is completely damaged because the second triangle is the result of the first one and in fact is mirrored by it. Hence, if a desired result on the top angle of the second triangle is locked, it is not surely the mirrored situation revealed by turning of the first triangle. It is here that the analysis does not come true because the turning triangle has lost its logic. A locked triangle may always show what politicians desire but in a wrong way. This may be among the prominent reasons why policy implementation in Islamic states at the both macro and micro levels, that is the domestic policies of any individual country as well as the regional policies, does not function well. The ill balance makes the situation as critical for most of these states.

Conclusion

As it was shown, policy implementation is among the most important phases of a policy cycle but this importance is usually neglected by authorities of states in Islamic countries. Although there are many limitations for having a complete implementation and there are also numerous obstacles implementation face with (Van Horn et al., 1975:463) but having right decisions made by policy-makers for achieving the desired goals (For more details: Stone, 1988) needs other parameters called triangles of LFM and EVL in this article. These two triangles are designed to show the images of crisis facing by many Islamic states and also for what called by Elmore (1985:33) as aiding policy practitioners.

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