

## **A New Security Order for the Persian Gulf: Building a Peaceful Islamic Region**

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### **Abstract**

In a world, where globalization and industrial and technological progress are the most frequently heard voices, the Persian Gulf yet remains as an outstanding region for the most precious strategic reserves of the world. The Persian Gulf harbors as the biggest reserves of the world are a major center for the production of oil and natural gas of the world. Such an importance has turned the Persian Gulf region into a hotbed for international tension and the presence of big powers particularly the United States in the region has endangered the security of the Persian Gulf region.

In the Middle East, the decade of globalization was marked by endless wars and continuing insecurity. Although, the increase in the flow of information and communication has served Muslim mobility but due to its ambiguity, globalization has created a contradictory and tension filled situation in the region.

Unfortunately, the Persian Gulf region at domestic level is the source of clashes among governments, sectarian rivalries, Islamic fundamentalism, and internal instability. On the global scale, Globalization was ushered into the region by war which gave the Western powers an excessive power over the region. The intervention of foreign powers has fueled tensions in the region to a great extent.

Hence, the process of globalization has proved highly turbulent and has generated new conflicts. Thus, a new plan is needed for the Persian Gulf region to weather the ongoing crisis and ensure its regional security in the future. The present paper, while reviewing the presence of the US in the region and the plans raised by this country, intends to design a new order for the Persian Gulf region so as to ensure its security.

**Key words:** Globalization, Communication, Regional Order, Security Order, Persian Gulf

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## Introduction

Security in the Persian Gulf has been an issue of perennial concern to the states of the region-- Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE-- as well as the external powers. As a strategic region with its share of cross-border tensions and international competition, the Persian Gulf has seen some of the bloodiest conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries so far. The security concerns that arise as a result generally revolve around balance of power considerations, regional rivalry, and domestic and regional stability. A second, related set of security concerns revolves around less conventional, newer challenges that have arisen mostly as a result of the Persian Gulf's more intimate nexus with the global market economy. Both of these sets of security challenges figure prominently in the calculations of policymakers in the region as well as in Washington and elsewhere (Kamrava, 2014)

In the new age, there is, however, a considerable debate about participation of the Persian Gulf countries in globalization. Some critics argue that Persian Gulf countries are opposing globalization perceiving it as Westernization but some others believe that it has strengthened Islamic Fundamentalism by facilitating the flow of information and communication. Resent uprising in the Persian Gulf region have focused with great excitement on the role played by the new media .It is somehow the new product of the 21<sup>st</sup> century driven by the world continuing integration-the process known as Globalization.

Generally, globalization due to its ambiguity, often acted as an obstacle rather than impetus to democratization. Persian Gulf countries have been sensitive about Islam because it is not only considered as a faith but also as a law. It seems that globalization has not been able to integrate eight countries of Persian Gulf at least to combat the foreign threat. Hence, the subject of security in the region of Persian Gulf has become a mystery in which lack of presentation of a suitable solution will lead to more intervention of trans-regional countries and detachment of effective bounds between the countries of the region. While all the states of the Persian Gulf share in general a joint security worries, but each country has its own worries and concerns. Definitely, stability in the production, flow and price of oil, non- intervention in domestic affairs and long-term economic development will be the common concerns of the oil exporting countries of this region.

The United States' continued engagement in the region has already been determined by its interests. The United States has had a longstanding historical presence in the Persian Gulf and therefore, should follow a policy that does not allow any regional actor to achieve supremacy. According to this attitude, the United States should adopt a policy that protects its regional allies with a reliable security umbrella (Walt, 2010). This can be achieved in three ways:

- Maintenance of a direct U.S. presence in the region.
- Withdrawal of American forces, leaving security affairs to regional states.
- Establishment of a new balance of power ( Barzegar, 2010: 77)

However, some critics argue that Balance of power will not provide the Persian Gulf security and, therefore, long-term policies that are based only on the balance of power would not be possible (Hunter, 2014).

US military attack to Iraq, made the United State more determined to create a new security framework for the Persian Gulf region, but the problems of the region made it more difficult for the United States. The United States ought to be able to live with this distrust and discount a good deal of this anti-Americanism as the "road rage" of a thwarted Arab world.

The current status of Iraq, nuclear technology of Iran, asymmetric threats (including terrorism), regional reassurance, regional tensions, and the roles of other external actors and domestic uprising in some of the countries in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that the United States effort to establish a suitable approach in the region has failed. Persian Gulf countries have also failed to establish a security framework for the region. Thus, a new order is needed to bring them together in order to maintain their cultural identity and independence in face of globalization.

### **Statement of Problem**

Most of the present systems in the Persian Gulf region have arisen out of the imperialist policies of 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1968, when Britain gave up its security responsibilities in East of Suez, the United States assumed the commitments among which the insurance of stability and security of the strategic region of Persian Gulf was the most important ones. In the next decades, Washington made attempt to perform the same activity in different methods: relying on Twin-Pillar Policy - Iran and Saudi Arabia in 1970, changing its direction towards Iraq in 1980, and Dual containment of Iran and Iraq in 1990, but none of the aforementioned methods replied in that region. (Ajami, 2002)

Thus, the past security systems, owing to their relying on the policies of the superpowers, made the small governments of the region steer to the margin. The continuity of this policies and geopolitical importance of the region made the region to stay under influence of dominant powers for some 50 years. The divergent procedure in the region in recent years has shown that the acute and chronic crisis of the region might not be originally settled through bilateral negotiations. Events in the region illustrate a growing need for constructive regional cooperation on everything from weapons of mass destruction proliferation to terrorism and to socioeconomic development. As the situation in Iraq deteriorates, Iran becomes more vocal about its role in the region and transnational terrorism and domestic instabilities continue to trouble regional governments who depend on a largely unpopular external superpower to provide their security. Lack of a standing security system and mechanisms acceptable by the regional countries increases the vacuum. Thus the need for a revamped, retooled, and more comprehensive regional strategy is evident.

The present article provides analysis for discussion of the future form of security in the Persian Gulf and aims to reply this question: Which type of order might provide a better prospect for the future peace and stability in the Persian Gulf? Replying the question might open the way for architecture of a security framework and some mechanisms in the region. The main question of every research serves as its main principle as it helps the research to take its own real path. The main cover of this research is related to creation of a security plan. Previous approaches to regional security in the Persian Gulf have failed. Therefore, new

approaches and policy options are to be duly considered and given equal weight to the status quo. The goal of this article is to lay out the broad parameters for more effective bilateral and multilateral security policies within the region considering that what is the provision for fulfillment of a joint security system in the Persian Gulf region?

### **Research Hypothesis**

On the basis of the main question, this research is based on the fact that contrary to the dominant strategy which is based on overt and covert threats and consolidation of economic and military superiority of the friends and the allies, the school oriented on security cooperation emphasizes on execution of the reciprocal commitments. Based on this approach, security is fulfilled not through dominance but through the denial of political-military actions. In this approach, all the states will enjoy more security through performance of reciprocal commitments by limitation of their military capabilities than through unilateral efforts for dominance and superiority. Under such approach not only the friends and the allied members take part in such security development, but the non-friends also accept the legal and technical limitations despite the bilateral distrust, because they believe that such limitations will guarantee multilateral interests of all.

The method of collection of data for testing and confirming the hypothesis is the library –based method and it will be performed on descriptive- analytical basis.

### **Nature of a Regional Order**

The primary goal of any security strategy is to create an order in what is otherwise an inherently anarchic international environment made up of individual nations and groups with conflicting as well as overlapping interests, values and ideologies. A security structure that is commonly understood can yield benefits because it can help to channel relationships, it can reduce the risk of conflict by increasing the capacity to predict the cost-benefit ratios of conflict and can also help regulate the conduct of conflicts when they occur. (United Nations, 1992: 686-689)

The principal factor in any enduring security order is that it is perceived as providing cultural, material, psychological and even spiritual goods: justice, freedom, prosperity, respect for one's identity or culture by others, a general sense of safety, and other such intangible but very real factors in human life. An order that is not seen as providing any of the aforementioned intangible goods to individuals, groups and states, and that provides only the minimum goal of an end to armed violence, is simply a tyranny that will ultimately break down under the weight of its own unjust practices. Order connotes a sense of permanence, at least across several decades and even generations. A durable and lasting order is one that is seen as maximally inclusive, that assimilates (in whatever form) diverse values, political goals, security agendas, state interests and so on.

Thus, in pragmatic security discussions, the idea of security orders is often opposed to any one side's winning a competition through the achievement of all their interests via threats, coercion and violence against their competitors. After all, a security order is ultimately

constructed through compromise- compromise is usually thought of as an agreement in which all sides get some of what they want, but no one gets everything they desire(Hunter,2010).

### **Traditional & Modern Studies of Security System**

Security policy of every state is a reaction to the threats arisen from a security environment and the fundamental objectives of that state. Accordingly, each government will define its security environment in the global and regional area and identifies the threats in order to plan for dealing with it. Hence, a proper perception of security environment will have the highest effect on security policy of every government.

Now-a-days, there are fundamental differences between the traditional and modern instructions. In modern attitude of security system, security of the states has close relationship with the degree of political, economical, and social development. Lack of political partnership, economic inequality, and social injustice shall have negative effects on the security of the states. The traditional instructions ignore such issues. In general, the traditional and modern views of security system might be studied under traditional and modern studies as follows:

#### **A. Traditional Studies of Security System**

The main emphasis of traditional studies concentrates on capability and military force, oriented on fundamental interpretation of security, i.e. lack of any military threats which is closely related with negative security. Based on such interpretation, security has taken a military conception and its main source is external factor. Therefore, the tools of providing security, is investment on the military and strategic sectors. From the traditional point of view, violence is an intrinsic and inborn requirement. This makes war as a Persistent phenomenon in each region and international system, because it is the war and violence which give meaning to the national security of a political unit.

Traditional realists add that the human life is naturally full of aggressive tendencies that can be pressured by the Coercive power of the government. Goals and objectives of the countries show inclinations towards superiority and dominance, not because it is derived from the systematic tendencies but an intrinsic nature of man. Conversely, the new realists emphasize on the systematic necessities as a source of control that banishes the tendency of aggression.

#### **B. Modern Studies of Security System**

This study is placed within the framework of a positive dialogue against the negative security which was mentioned in traditional studies. In such studies, non-military dimensions are propounded as effective security elements. The factors such as economic, political, social, environmental factors serve as software dimensions of security, threatening of which may lead to insecurity. Modern studies are based on the fact that mere emphasis on military and hard ware force might not fulfill the security requirements, though ultra modern studies seek a solution to keep and protect the dialogue of positive security in the new global circumstances.

## **Invasion of Iraq and the Necessity for a Security Order**

Although before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the structure of security in the Persian Gulf region was shaky, the old system of security was shattered by this war, and, since then, the United States, because of its own self-interest, has had no choice but to help shape and develop the system that takes its place (Kraig, 2006).

The new conditions of the Persian Gulf after the US military attack on Iraq propounds, more than before, a necessity for a stable security order in the region. The new circumstances may be raised as follows:

1-Invasion on Iraq by the United States brought about a space of worries among the governments of the region, indicating that the United States can endanger the entity of the regimes in the Persian Gulf for its own benefits on the basis of preventive theory at its discretion.

2-The plan for democratization of the region by the United States has increased the people's expectations in the region for general partnership in the policies of the state. This issue has brought about a wave of unrest by the people of the region against their governments.

3-Fall of Saddam has led to the mistrust of the Persian Gulf countries about the US support, the clear consequence of which is the increasing fear of ruling governments of the region of disarray of political-social systems of these regimes by the United States.

4-Continuation of the US military presence in Iraq and intervention of this country in domestic sovereignty of this state indicates the long-term interests of the United States and the west in this region. This means that regional security is tied to global security and the principle of independence and sovereignty of the Persian Gulf states is a function of international system.

5-Incapability of the United Nation in removing the problems of Iraq has led to replacement of the American principles and values by the international rules and regulations leading to increasing political, economic and social pressures of the US on the region.

## **Propounding a Regional Security Order**

The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council which brings together the countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was established in May 1981 to confront their security challenges collectively. Although, the aim of six states of the Cooperation was "co-ordination, integration, and co-operation among the member-states in all fields, but the immediate objective was to protect themselves from the revolutionary regime in Tehran and the dangers posed by the Iran-Iraq War .

But the GCC has been unable to establish itself as a full-fledged regional security organization. This inability can be traced back to numerous factors:

1- The main constraints are the lack of a supranational authority in effect providing the organization with no sovereignty or political independence,

and the lack of any kind of authorization that can demand the compliance of member states on any matter.

2- A second major factor is the external intervention in the region to the point that the Persian Gulf represents a highly penetrated system. The reliance on a strong military power such as the United States continues to be seen as an essential element for the GCC states to safeguard their own security and national existence.

3- Other outstanding issues that have prevented closer security cooperation include outstanding border issues and internal rivalries that continue to impact on the internal working of the GCC and cast a shadow on the organization's future outlook. Overall, there still exists a degree of suspicion and lack of trust that characterizes the relationship among the GCC states.

The result is the weakness of the GCC as an institution where the dichotomy of the individual vs. the collective level is ever present. All of this, in turn, leaves little room for compromise

(Al Shayeji, 2009).

Generally, the countries of the region as independent sovereign states are considered as the main focus for establishing a framework for security and stability of the Persian Gulf region. They are composed of individuals and groups that can affect the internal dimensions of peace and stability in the region. On the other hand, by expansion of transportation and increasing growth of information technology, the national and regional and global security, have been undeniably inseparable. Oil and natural gas in the Persian Gulf region are considered the basic elements of the world economy.

Hence, the security in the Persian Gulf region is naturally tied with the socio-economic development of the world (Tyler, 1992:5-6).

However, some countries tried to counter a range of their security concerns in different ways. Qatar, for example, was a traditional, risk-averse monarchy until the early 1990s. Financed by gas exports and protected by a US security umbrella, Qatar has diversified its foreign relations to include Iran and Israel, established the satellite broadcaster Al Jazeera, assumed a leading role in international mediation.(Roberts,2014)

Therefore, so long as socio-economic development is regarded as the key global security issue, security in the Persian Gulf region serves as a global value. However, if the regional security is interpreted as a situation in which the financial and human capitals of the nations are primarily used for social, political, economic and spiritual development than military use, its application in the Persian Gulf encounters with a dual conflict. (Hasbani, [www.worldsecuritynetwork.com](http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com))

On the one hand, the Persian Gulf region has been militarized by the trans-regional powers specially the United States and no effort has been made for promotion of its economic, social, spiritual situation and all efforts have merely been made to access resources of the region. On the other hand, states of the region for the reason of region's exposure to the military and internal conflicts have been focused on security and defense issues and other issues have been overshadowed by it. The Western – mainly American with some British - military presence in the region is not simply a matter of providing security and protection for local regimes. These are important roles, but not more important than securing

the strategic location of the oil fields. If there were a scenario where the oil fields no longer played a critical role (due to the depletion of oil, for example), then the “strategic location” of the Persian Gulf would be largely diminished. Hence the incentive for such a large western military presence would also decrease, at least from its current intensive form. (Gulf, 2013).

Therefore, the ultimate goal of a regional security framework in the Persian Gulf is to create a peaceful and stable structure of relations that allows each country to fulfill its minimum security requirements and develop their political, economic, social, cultural institutions, concurrent with increased levels of threats against others. Such a security scheme can be assessed in response to four major obligation categories:

- Shall respond to the ways in which countries are using their powers.
- Shall state the consequences of the policies in which powers have been applied.
- Shall declare the goals and objectives in which powers have been used.
- Shall take into consideration the probable limitation for creation of a military power.

But, since the Persian Gulf countries are facing with domestic legitimacy, creation of such a security order will be facing several problems including the following ambiguities:

- 1-What expresses the legal use of power?
- 2-Is it legitimacy or the sovereignty that justifies the use of means of power?
- 3-What guarantee is there for the cooperation of the Persian Gulf countries for maintenance and continuation of such a scheme?

This means that some more powerful countries of the region, probably consider the security framework less advantageous or against their own beliefs and values. In such case, they might take some ways to weaken or destroy the framework which finally may lead to collapse of the security plan in the region (Kraig, Fall 2004).

Generally, in pragmatic security issues, the idea of security order has often been rejected by the country succeeded in pursuit of its interests through intimidation, coercion or war against its rivals.

Thus, The Persian Gulf regional security order should be such to manage the inter-regional competition and competitiveness of the region and to control the trans-regional powers to intervene as well. However, since September 11 the occurrence of what is called “disordered multilateralism”, where an open competition is observed between two models of global supervision in the world: US unilateralism against EU regionalism. (Ikenberry, 2001: 35-40).



## **Problems facing Creation of a Security Plan in the Persian Gulf Region**

1-The US Preventive and preemptive policy has led to Mental discharge of most of the Arab countries of the region. They just do not see themselves able to exercise sovereignty in the political scene,they mainly play the role of the US military bases the region.

2-The United States, on the pretext of nuclear technology of Iran, not only tries to increase the conflict among the regional countries, but by negative propagation, has tried to make the countries of the region more dependent on itself.

3-The free flow of energy still plays a major role in the Persian Gulf as the principle interests of the United States and the west. This will affect the provision of any security plan. Therefore, to provide security order regardless of hegemony (the U.S.) will be difficult.

4-Lack of confidence building measures in the Persian Gulf region has made the conflict to persist and spread.

5-Different attitudes of governments in the Persian Gulf region regarding the “security of the Persian Gulf” have expanded the area of insecurity (Update. unv.edu / archive / issue 35\_ 1. htm. January - February 2004.\_

6-. Such insecurity has led to wrong perception. Due to existence of a insecurity, presuming that most of the countries are non-aggressive and satisfied with their lives, the countries will move towards self defense at high costs. However, the defense capability of a country depends on its ability against potential attack. Similarly, when a country tries to maintain and sometimes to increase effectiveness of its armed forces, the other may consider it as a hostile action and responds by coercive means. This is repeated inside a spiral circle.

This has resulted in to a security dilemma, because none of them acted without rational However, that may be a mistake to recognize the enemy which may not have a real existence, but it is a reasonable mistake. The countries of the Persian Gulf region **do not** have access to each other intentions and purposes. They only see the others’ capabilities pessimistically which indicates a security dilemma stemming from some actions and reactions.

## **International Security Order**

The wheels of history at present century are moving in a way that the world has experienced enormous changes. The world requires a stable international order. Global economy requires global cooperation. The world has changed to a global village and a new international economic and political order is needed to provide rules and regulations of the global village. The National Intelligence Council, a U.S. government think tank, projects that by 2025, China and India will have the world's second- and fourth-largest economies, respectively. Such growth is opening the way for a multipolar era in world politics (Ebrahimi far, 2006: 127-130).

With the dramatic development of the attitude of political multilateralism and global economy, creation of a peaceful, stable, just and reasonable international political and economic order is considered as a basic requirement. It should be mentioned that creation of a new order rather than the last one is a huge and heavy job and a long time reach. This requires the wisdom and efforts of countries and joint efforts of all states. Although the UN's efforts and support can be considered a starting point for creating a new international order. (Drezner, March/April 2007)

Holesti has identified eight provisions for creation of an international fixed order:

1-System of governance: This does not necessarily mean a formal institution

but - it on the contrary- means some or all the players or one organ instead of all which is able to make decision in cases which conducts a lenient foreign political behavior, to identify major violations from norms and rules and to be ready for taking joint actions for performing the same.

2-Legitimacy: an order must be legitimate. Peaceful settlement providing basis for an order after hostility, shall not pave the way for a new war to overturn the results of a former war.

3-Assimilation: an international system shall assimilate all sets of players, both governmental and non-governmental group, that may consider themselves outside the established order. Assimilation is associated with legitimacy. The aim of assimilation is to show that the achievements of the system are more important than potential privileges for searching superiority over others or to destroy others.

4-Deterrent System: there shall exist a deterrent system to defend the aggression or hostile actions which decrease the new order. Definitely, the definition of deterrent is the key to global and regional strategies. Though, in the Holesti system, deterrent shall be ideally coordinated with a complete section of a multi lateral order, not like the policies of a country against another country, based on bilateral agreement.

5-Containing of the Methods and Foundations: System of governance must contain some procedures and institutions for identification, awareness, management, and settlement of disputes among the members. Although it is not enough for mere survival of such a procedure, they should be used completely and continuously. The norm includes this pre-supposition that hostile countries should apply several possibilities.

6-Development of norms: Those who are planning an order, should develop a powerful norm against use of force and design precisely those consequences that are justified.

7-Peaceful Change: there should be some procedures for a peaceful change. According to Holesti, "change is the basis of social, economic, political life". So it makes one of the great problems of international relations. Unfortunately, few agreements have assimilated the methods for reviewing the courses of settlement, removing the complaints and in general, to comply with the implementation of commitments and responsibilities to the new social, economic, diplomatic conditions.

8-Prediction of Future Issues: the new international order shall predict occurrence of future political and social issues which pave the way for a military war. According to Holesti, all significant peace agreements have failed on important aspect. The designers were those who were have looked back. (New Century Call;English. People daily. Com .cn / english / 200009 / 06 / eng20000906- 4985. html)

According to Holesti, this framework reduces distrust, uncertainty and disagreement about the future and provides parameters for conflicting approaches as a result which distrust will be reduced to the extent that consensus and compromise seems more desirable.

### **American Orders in the Persian Gulf**

For the security of the Persian Gulf, The United States is facing different challenges. That is the main reason that the American global hegemony is grafted with heavy military presence in the region ( Sajadpour, 2012) With the gradual withdrawal of British forces from the beginning of 1968 which ended in 1971, The UK entrusted responsibilities of the East of Suez to the United States. The most important duty inherited by the US was to provide stability and security of the strategic region of Persian Gulf.

In command of the world's largest hydrocarbon reserves and occupying a central role in both Middle Eastern and global politics, the six traditional monarchies--Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)--that comprise the GCC are now among the most heavily researched yet most commonly misunderstood actors in the international system(Davidson,2012)

Over time, the free and stable flow of oil from this region to the other parts of the world became the main and initial interests of the United States. The main reason was the US vital interest in huge amount of oil of the region and relatively its cheap price and that global economy is based on cheap and abundant oil of the region and if this basis is changed, the global economy will collapse. ( Holesti ,1991: 335-343).

It seems that the Persian Gulf region at least in 21st century continues to be regarded as a regional exporter of energy resources (Pollack,2003). For maintaining this vast resources, the United States, after the liberation of Kuwait in 1992 decided to locate a large amounts of military equipments within the borders of member countries of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (Elahi, 2002:30).

The presence of U.S. troops may have stabilized the Persian Gulf, but, as the recent terrorist incident in Saudi Arabia demonstrated, the troops have also been, and remain, a source of tension and instability. ( Preble, 2012).

During past decades, Washington has tried to provide stability and security of the region in different forms, which are mentioned as follows:

1-Order based on Regional Hegemony: After British withdrawal of the Persian Gulf and replacement of the United States, security of Persian Gulf was turned to an American form. The victorious and dominant US was seeking a new plan to create peace and stability in the region and to protect its long-term interests. Thus, from the beginning of cold war up to the end of 1970s, the US presented its security plan based on "Twin-

Pillar policy". On this basis, two powerful countries of the region, i.e. Saudi Arabia and Iran were determined as pillars of the US interests in the region. Saudi Arabia, because of its vast oil revenues and ideological influence- existence of Mecca and Medina – on the other regional countries, could provide the US interests and control Islamic insurgencies against any foreign power in the region. Iran was also considered as a powerful political and economical base of the United States as well. After the Islamic revolution in 1978 in Iran, this plan was terminated.

2-Order based on Dual Containment: By the Islamic Republic of Iran one of these two pillars in the region was turned against the US interests. On the other hand, Iraqi Baath Regime which was supported by the Soviet Union claimed for leadership in Arab world. Hence, in 1980 United States, with the help of sheikhdoms of the region, made efforts to create peace and stability by creating a new balance of power.  
( Lotfian,1998:105)

In 1995, of total Middle East defense costs of 43 billion dollars, 1/3<sup>rd</sup> belonged to Saudi Arabia and more than half of it was related to the member countries of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council.

The US pressure on Iran and Iraq during the Iraq's war against Iran was in a way to prevent emergence of Iran and Iraq as superior powers in order to provide the security of the other countries of the region.( GlobalSecurity.org, "Operation Northern Watch,") But, American support of Iraq in the mentioned war provided Iraq to equip mass destruction weapons, a clear example of which was Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran. Iraq's refusal to accept the obligations of the United Nations Security Council lead to disputes between America and Iraq. The US power balance plan could not control the power of mass destruction of Iraq, thus, in May 1993, shortly after the Clinton administration came to power, he clearly announced dual containment policy against Iran and Iraq. Such an attempt was towards simultaneous weakening of Iran and Iraq as a counterweight against other countries in the region.

In 1998, Clinton government exceeded the limit by adding a new dimension to the US policy and Called for a regime change in Iraq. Thus, the dual containment policy ,aimed at creation of balance of powers in the region, not only did not gain success but also undermined the relative regional balance of power(Katzman,2000).

3- Order Based on Force: General strategy of the United States is a policy-based hegemony. Hegemony strategy is based on superiority of interests of a state on the other states by practical use of military and economic tools. In fact, the USA emphasizes on completion of a thread-based methodology in national security for protection and development of its high interests in the world after the cold war. For the same purpose, it clearly and explicitly attempts to dominate its interests. This thread-based methodology has been applied in the realm of nuclear weapons as a counter-strategy. An obvious example is the Iranian nuclear program since the United States is concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. By this nuclear development, Iran will be able to convert itself to an absolute power in the region to protect its national interests. If this happens, the main foreign policy of Iran's rivals such as the United States and Israel in the Middle East will be lost (Kraig, 2006:34). That's why these two countries are concerned about Iran's nuclear technology development. Based on the western sources it has been estimated that

Iran shall be able to achieve the nuclear fusion within 10 years.( " Iran's Race for Nuclear Weapons,2003). The United States is demanding Iran to stop its nuclear program. Iran considers it as its obvious right to have access to nuclear technology and enjoy the right of nuclear energy as a NPT member under charter 4 of NPT.

The other conventional methods are the preventive and preemptive strategy which are regarded as goals of the US national-security policy making. Indeed, it can be mentioned that the United States has a clear strategy: Military Anti-nuclear weapons approach intertwined with deterrence, force diplomacy, military superiority, and preventive or preemptive military forces. This approach has emerged in the Persian Gulf region as the force policy or Policy based on threats.

The Policy based on force, is an explicit policy based on military threats, but such threatening does not mean the removal of all the players, but bilateral or multilateral relations based on the selected option will be considered which means the official and non-official unity of security agreements between the allied friends. For the USA this selected choice includes Israel, South Korea, and the members of the Persian Gulf Security Council They benefit from favorable trade relations and the US military technology aids in order to enter the circle of the friends and allies.

The US security posture suffers from different shortcomings (Ramayana, 1979):

- 1- The potential polarization of the Middle East into camps of "pro-Western" and other nations.
- 2-potential disadvantage is the intensification of arms transfers to the Middle East.
- 3-the possibility that it may hobble efforts to achieve security in the Persian Gulf, by linking them to the extremely difficult Arab-Israeli peacemaking process.

Thus. the United States by its threat does not aim to create a balance between independent actors but to reinforce the military and economic superiority between the friends and the allies. The expression of Bush stating: "Whoever is not with us, is our enemy" is a clear interpretation of the policy based on force. The US intentions in the Persian Gulf Wars were totally military in nature and attempted to achieve it through mass destruction. In this situation, the USA intends to manifest its military superiority to let all understand that it will not tolerate any disobedience. In all wars, US has preferred the military solution to the diplomacy (Gaffny2004). Formation of regional crisis and Arabs encountering of Arabs indicates presents a Targeted programming of the new American order; the order which justifies the American presence in strategic regions of the world.

### **Possible Scenario for a New Regional Order**

The major problem is creating a new order that includes an organized management of the competition between countries based on values and interests, and one that leads to sustainable peace and security in the region. The model for security and stability that has to date been imposed on this region has been one based on competition, rivalry and the formation of competing blocs. The only outcome has been the fostering of fresh imbalances and the emergence of unrealized or unstated

ambitions that have repeatedly menaced the region over the past three decades.

The most important components of foreign policy is the ability of decision makers to project their country's interests in the highest and most effective form of strategy. Such condition requires experts to a multi-level approaches in policy formulation. One must consider how actors think and response to certain events while at the same time, he must understand the ability of the actor to utilize all necessary local and national potentials to create and implement rational policy.( Sevilla,2011:60 ).

To reverse the vicious cycle of suspicion and mistrust and move forward, according to the Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr. Zarif, it is imperative that we keep three points in mind:

1- It is crucial that we build an inclusive framework for confidence and cooperation in this strategic region. Any exclusion will be the seed of future mistrust, tension and crisis. The core of any wider regional arrangement should be limited to the eight littoral states.

2- We need to be clear that while our cooperation is not at the expense of any other party, and will in fact promote greater security for all, we are very much cognizant of the variety of interests involved in our region.

3- The international element of the instability in our region stems from the divergence of the nature of the interests of various outside powers and their competition. Their injection of extraneous issues only complicates an already complex security situation further. The presence of foreign forces has historically resulted in domestic instability within the countries hosting them and exacerbated the existing tensions between these countries and other regional states (Zarif, 2013)

The way to restore security in the Persian Gulf must not be in line with the path that reflects the values and methods of the United States, though Washington -- thanks to its political, economic, and military capabilities - - seeks to balance the value systems in the Persian Gulf. Global issues and the historical relations of the Persian Gulf countries with other regions have enhanced such trends. Experience has shown that bilateral ties or unilateral performance of the Persian Gulf countries and foreign powers have failed to completely resolve the crises in the region. The situation is further triggered by the lack of a comprehensive security plan as well as compatible mechanisms to resolve tensions. This further highlights the need for a real security structure. A scenario to create a regional order aimed at improving peace and tranquility in the Persian Gulf region could be possible as follow:

**A- Coalition with Major Powers:** This model emphasizes regional players' involvement in political decision-makings of the regional system, but it is based on the domination of a non-regional intrusive power. The exchange of arsenals and defense deals between the member states of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) and the US shows their desire in making a coalition with America, and at the same time, acts as a kind of justification for the US hegemony in the region. In its military exercises in the Persian Gulf, Iran called for a "new security order" in Gulf without the participation of the American forces (Mansharof, Y. & Savyon A. 2010).

Despite the problems created by major powers in the Persian Gulf region, the PGCC member states continue to rely on foreign powers to receive support for their sovereignty and internal identity as well as secure their regimes. This is carried out through making bilateral or multilateral coalitions. In such an order, mutual cooperation between the United States and the PGCC member states acts as the main layer. The relations may be enhanced to create a more strengthened coalition army. The council also facilitates the exchange of major and further information and intelligence in order to make on time warnings about possible threats. The improvement of the PGCC collective security system will help unite the region's military forces with those of the United States.

However, such an order cannot guarantee the security in the Persian Gulf region, because it creates what are seen as paradoxes:

1-Such coalitions would lead to internal instability, because they show the inability of the ruling regimes about self-defense and result in a very negative image of the mass society about their authorities' dependency on foreign imperialism. 2- Foreign assistance may weaken the need of regional countries for a joint defense doctrine and arsenal programs, and as a result countries would be willing to make bilateral deals instead of multi-lateral and defense agreements. 3-Dependency on foreign powers decreases the need for public cooperation, because countries that enjoy foreign military assistance have the illusion that they can achieve their foreign goals through relative domination on their enemies rather than making reconciliation and trust. 4- There is the possibility that foreign assistance bring certain value systems that could gradually distance the region from its spiritual values. 5-Foreign coalitions may prepare the ground for the presence of multiple foreign powers. This usually forces regional countries to act as a shield among foreign powers. 6- Foreign coalitions are usually in accordance with the political and economic purposes of major powers. This makes the military industries of major countries become so powerful in the region that they would even overshadow internal and employment affairs in the region. 7- Mutual coalitions may display a country's defense policies as aggressive. This would put regional countries in a position against each other, which may wage wars.

**B- Creation of Regional Defense System:** Such a defense system can be created in two ways:

1-Formal defense alliance with the United States (Persian Gulf NATO): The idea has come from the US, that a formal defense alliance is formed with the PGCC member states and a new government is established in Iraq.( Pallmeyer ,1992) .

According to Lord Ismay, "the US entrance was aimed at expelling Iranians and defeating Iraqis" (Hunter, 2010: xix). From the US viewpoint, the formal defense alliance could be the best method to convince the Persian Gulf states that American forces must be in the region as part of their societies, and that a secure structure is prepared for the renewal of the US arsenal accords with the PGCC member states. On the other hand, the PGCC leaders are concerned that their regimes will be condemned as illegal in case that they fail to legitimize the US presence in the region.

2- Persian Gulf Regional Security Assistance (PGRSA): Another method to secure the Persian Gulf is formation of a new joint regional defense

alliance that could be comprised of Iran, Iraq, and the six members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. This aims to bring a new security belt in the region in order to decrease the presence of the US and other extra-regional powers.

The initial aim of this order is to create a secure environment in the region, based on which internal and international tensions are minimized or eliminated via increasing cooperation. This order can also guarantee the security of shipping, oil exports, maritime collisions, and the fight against narcotics, plus providing a confidence-building model for military affairs. In general, such an order can contain various regional issues in the form of an extensive network comprising of all countries in the region. The important point is that the order can increase exchanges and interactions among regional countries, and as a result, the organizations are established that would support proposals on multi-cooperation. Once the regional security accord is stabilized, discussions could be launched on the exchange of information and making agreements. Members of this defense alliance could deal with solid criteria such as reporting on activities, as well as exchange of supervisors and information. The ultimate goal could be agreements on controlling armed forces. One of the advantages of such accord is to prepare grounds for Iran's participation. But the problem is that such an accord could be possibly not achieved successfully, because:

- Military security cannot be trusted through imported weapons. Regional countries' bilateral deals with foreign powers, different weapons with various usages, and different arsenals with various experts and expertise have turned the region into a place accumulated with weapons. This, at the time of a crisis, makes impossible the coordination and implementation of military affairs aimed at restoring security in the region.

- Military assistance by major powers weakens regional countries' need for the creation of a joint defense alliance, and diminishes public expectation for the creation of such an alliance.

**C- Order Based on Collaboration and Cooperation:** In general, security is strongly defined as a collective system which cannot be divided. The main concept of collective security is that security and stability can only be restored and guaranteed through cooperation, and that nations' rely on self-assistance and self-defense can immunize them against potential and de facto threats. The main idea of the collective security is that all countries would enjoy more relative security through mutual commitments rather than bilateral efforts to obtain domination. This attitude does not divide countries into groups of friends, allies and enemies, but behaves all operators as equal sides in their efforts to achieve mutual security.

The model of the collective security is based on the "non-zero sum game" which is shaped on the basis of mutual political and economic dependency. Such understanding can be created by limited cooperation and coordination, and lead to sustainable convergence. It seems that the dependency of regional countries on the "zero sum game" attitude has made each of them restore its security in a unilateral way. That's why the cooperation among the PGCC member states has not resulted in a sustainable convergence.



The panorama of the cooperation-based security is founded on the principle that opponents and even enemies, despite mutual mistrust, suffer from equal lawful pressures, just like allies and friends. The attitude stresses that security is followed by countries in the best possible way rather than being used against them, even in cases in which countries pursue issues with different value systems and ideological goals. It is also supposed that security is not guaranteed through domination yet it is restored by prohibiting policies aimed at achieving domination on others. The essence of the collective security is based on the mutual security dependency, which says the security of any member relies on the security of other countries. The collaboration-based order can be considered as an effective power based on mutual trust. Two factors are actually needed for such an order to be fulfilled.

The first factor is an independent government which reaches agreements with other countries. Common geopolitical conditions to facilitate cooperation is the second factor. Independent countries in the Persian Gulf region are included in such an order thanks to their distinguished geopolitical conditions. This means that the rows between these countries are not so much that so much that prevents them from entering a new framework for cooperation. The countries share any achievements they want. The only concern over the cooperation is that if an internal revolution changes the structure in a country, like the revolution in Iran in 1979, it would be very difficult to draw a roadmap on how to keep the agreements between the countries that have made a security framework. In any way, cooperation and collective security is opposed to any kind of arm race and seeking military purposes. Such an order has many advantages in comparison with other ones, because it makes:

- Governments to some extent share common interests and values so that they can have a similar definition of national security and stability.
- Countries trust in their rivals so that they do not ruin the whole system in the name of developing a specific value system.
- Countries respect the sovereignty and independency of all players.
- The intra-national movements and ideologies not harm the countries' main role as the key players.
- Governments' preferred policies are reasonably predictable in the course of time in order that mutual confidence is built.
- Internal policies of countries are largely protected from changes resulted by their foreign policies.

### **Conditions for Fulfillment of Collaboration-Based Order**

**Intellectual Agreement:** Collective security is based on an intellectual agreement by the regional countries on the value of regional peace as well as their commitment to the undivided status qua of it. They must admit that the rejection of this fact by any country would bring insecurity to the whole peace system in the region. Therefore, each country must accept that peace cannot be achieved in an abstractive way, and that collective security needs commitment to an international model of behavior which must not be infringed.


**Balance of Power:** The practical conditions to achieve collective security are to distribute power among the Persian Gulf countries. From a realistic viewpoint, the balance of power is the best way to calm tensions. Peace in the region is achieved when power is distributed among countries in the way that no nation mulls over invading the other one and that all countries have the necessary ability of self-defense. In general, following conditions are needed so that the policy of power balance is prevailed in the region:

- 1-Countries must have precise information about incentives and capabilities of each other and must show proper reaction to the information.
- 2- The capabilities and incentives of the countries must be relatively balanced and equal.
- 3- Countries should select a common political culture in which the laws of the security regime are respected.
- 4-Countries must have deterrence arsenal technology with almost same level.

One of the major sources that have explained the important role of "region" in international relations is a work by Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel. The authors pointing out the convergence and divergence factors explain three levels of analyzing global system, regional system and internal system. The authors have divided every region into three sections of core, periphery, and intrusive. The core forms the center of politics, which is comprised of a number of interactive countries with sociopolitical, economic and organizational connections. The periphery section includes countries that have less unstainable ties as long as regional policy is concerned, and are largely leaning towards outside the region. Yet, there is the possibility that periphery countries could be able to join the core section in the future. The intrusive section puts on its agenda the participation in regional affairs and is in charge of dealing with the affairs of these countries. The interaction among these three levels introduces the region as the intermediation between national governments and the ruling international system (Contori & Spiegel 1970: 28-29).


The Cantori and Spiegel model can be complied with the Persian Gulf region. Therefore, the six-member PGCC is put at the core; Iran and Iraq are the countries that are influential on the regional policy (nuclear) and their policies are leaning towards outside the region, therefore are put in the periphery sector. The US plays the role of the extra-regional power in the Persian Gulf and is regarded as the intrusive factor (figure 1)

**Fig.1- Levels of a subordinate system**



However, the formation of such an order faces several problems the most important of which is the survival of it in the international environment. Regarding the US direct presence in the Persian Gulf region (Iraq) and the global hegemony's dominance on international system, the order cannot be achieved unless the power of hegemony (the US) and international environment are taken into consideration, because the survival of the order in international environment is tantamount to leave the global hegemony behind (figure 2). Therefore, three main conditions are needed so that the cooperation-based order is achieved and sustained:

**Fig.2- Order Based on Cooperation in the Persian Gulf**



**A—The policies of this regional order must be defensive not aggressive:** Any new order in the Persian Gulf region must be based on policies that rule and uphold security and stability so that it can be sustained. Therefore, the regional countries must move towards forging an order that, while restoring regional order and stability, maintains the independency and territorial integrity of countries and resist elements sabotaging the calm in the region. This means that the new regional order must be formed based on the security needs of the regional countries and it should be a framework for the region's stability rather than being aggressive against other countries. Any order that is founded on the basis of aggressive policy against major powers will face reactions at the first stage, which would possibly destroy it before getting strengthened.

**B-This Order is not to be organized merely in contradiction with the world hegemony:** Efforts are made to create a new order in the region where the hegemony power has significant interests. The formation and survival of the order depends on the amount of its interaction with international system. The power of the world hegemony at the present time is so much that it can make the interaction ineffective or completely cut. The new regional order must necessarily avoid any conflict or friction with the global hegemony so that it can be formed and finally survived. The conflict between two orders usually leads to the disruption of the weaker one. Regarding the discordant between the relations of regional countries and the influence of extra-regional powers on these countries, the resistance and survival of any order with such insure and

fragile elements to some extent seem impossible. When an order is formulated and implemented, it should not be against the interests of the hegemony country rather it must be organized based on the interests in line with those of the global hegemony.

**C-International environment:** The sustainability of any order depends on the degree of its interaction with the international system. Regarding the US presence in Iraq and its influence on regional countries, the creation of any order in the region and its sustainability in international arena seems impossible unless it leaves behind the US influence (hegemony power). It should be mentioned that the US pullout of the region does not mean an end to its interests in the region. Therefore, the barrier between the new regional order and international system will remain.

### **Conclusion**

Three main problems have threatened the US interests in the Persian Gulf region over the past years: the situation in Iraq, Iran's nuclear energy program, and internal tensions in the PGCC member states. It has not been an easy task for the US to find solutions to these problems and improve the situation. The United States' failure in Iraq, its failure to isolate Iran and force it to abandon its nuclear energy program, and also its failure to control the internal situation in PGCC states has made it clear for the US that it has to create a more strengthened form of the security in the Persian Gulf region. It seems that a review into the US strategy on the Persian Gulf security and stability is necessary, because the security problems in the Persian Gulf are intensifying rather than being resolved.

On the other hand, security and stability in the Persian Gulf are achieved when key regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia are involved, along other neighbors, in a set of helpful bilateral ties dominant by mutual respect instead of fear. A new security order could only be designed through curbing defeated strategies as well as the regional supremacy and global hegemony in the way that it is considered fair by all regional countries and is useful in restoring global security. The hegemony-based strategy relies on making explicit and implicit threats, an example of which is seen in economic and military powers, both in accordance with the US hegemonic policies. However, the cooperation-based strategy demands a set of geopolitical conditions created. Such strategy is gradually placed on a value system based on a network of friends who have permanent political preferences and enjoy internal stability. This cooperation model can be considered as the balance of interests, on the basis of assurance.

Regarding that the experience of other regional accords cannot be attributed to the Persian Gulf, three main conditions could be effective in achieving a security regime in this region. First of all, the order must encourage government officials to hold regional meetings on reaching a common view about regional problems and finding solutions to them. Secondly, the order must include all regional countries regardless of their political and ideological views. Finally, the order must take steps towards those set of regional cooperation that are easy to agree. For example, it

avoids agreement on main political issues because it takes much time that all member countries of a security order can reach mutual trust necessary to make long-term relations and cooperation. The author has tried to design an order in which security is achieved in an easier way.

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